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Abstract 
We examine the largest house energy efficiency retrofit support program in Greece 
that ran during 2011-2015 and approximately fifty thousand households participated. 
We take advantage of an exogenous change that occurred while the program was 
running. This change substantially increased the subsidy rate for lower-income 
households. We find that this effective cost reduction increased the participation rate 
(extensive margin) and investment amount (intensive margin) of these lower-income 
households.  
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1. Introduction 
Governments have continuously researching ways to stop climate change and reduce 
energy dependency on the ever decreasing fossil fuels reserves. The most recent 
Directive of the EU (2012) set a 20% energy savings by 2020. Within the Directive, 
one of the main policies proposed is the retrofit of existing houses “such as improving 
the efficiency of heating systems, installing double glazed windows or insulating 
roofs”.1 To this end, a number of countries have implemented policy support 
programs to incentivize home owners to invest in energy efficiency retrofits (EER).
2
 
 Studies have shown that EERs can potentially reduce energy use and improve 
public health (Thomson and Thomas 2015; Webber et al. 2015). Furthermore, Milne 
and Boardman (2000) have found that for lower-income household, EERs will 
increase the average temperature, as the current temperature (14
o
C) is well below 
comfort levels, in addition to saving energy. However, numerous policy reports 
identify that such support programs may not be accessible for lower-income 
households.
3
 
 Our objective is to examine whether effective cost reductions in EERs 
influence the behavior of lower-income households. While the answer may seem 
intuitive, studies have shown that monetary incentives may not play a significant role 
in EER investments or the participation rate of support programs (e.g. Fowlie et al. 
2015). Trotta (2018) cites various even psychological factors influencing household 
behavior, then he provides evidence that low-income households appear less likely to 
invest in energy efficient retrofit measures comparing with medium and high-income 
households. Various studies have examined impacts of different policy schemes; 
however, there have been though few large-scale ex post evaluations of the actual 
impacts (Webber et al. 2015). 
To examine such a question, one would need to find an exogenous change in 
EER costs. In this paper, we opt for an alternative by examining the largest EER 
program that took place in Greece and ran between 2011 and 2015 with 50,038 
participants.  
                                                          
1
 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-directive  
2
 For an overview of house energy efficiency action plans and reports per country, see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efficiency/buildings/financing-renovations 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/node/84  
3
 For the US see Cluett et al. 2016, for Europe see Ugarte et al. 2016 and Ordonez et al. 2017, for 
Australia see ACOSS (2013). 
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The aforementioned support program provided financial support for an up to a 
€15,000 EER budget. A share of the budget was covered by a subsidy, while for the 
remaining share the program offered an interest-free loan. The unique setting stems 
from the fact that during the first year of the support program, the income criteria 
changed and the subsidy rate increased substantially for lower-income households. To 
this end, we are able to identify the effect an increase in subsidy rate (effective 
decrease in EER costs) had on lower-income households’ EER behavior.  
We provide two independent empirical setups to answer the above question. In 
the first, each participating household is assigned to a zip code; we classify each zip 
code based on the overall income level. We then examine the aggregate behavior of 
the zip code before and after the subsidy change. We perform this Difference-in-
Differences (Dif-in-Difs, Card and Krueger, 1994) approach by comparing the change 
between lower-income and higher-income zip codes.  
In the second setup, we examine the behavior of households that entered right 
after the subsidy change but had likely filed with the old subsidy in place and 
compare it with households’ behavior that entered a few months after the policy 
change and likely filed with the new subsidy in place. The empirical results from this 
approach reach to similar results as the zip code analysis. 
Our first result shows that lower-income households increased their 
participation once the subsidy increased. We call this the extensive margin
4
; in other 
words an effective decrease in the EER cost for lower-income households resulted to 
an increased participation of these households.  
Our second result is that lower-income households also increased the 
investment amount on EERs; we call this the intensive margin. In particular, the 
average house from a lower-income region increased its budget by 5% more than the 
average house in higher-income regions. Detailed data on households from the second 
empirical setup show an even bigger effect. This latter result constitutes a significant 
contribution of our paper as most studies on EER support programs report findings 
with respect to the extensive margin while findings with respect to the intensive 
margin are more scarce. 
                                                          
4
 The terms “extensive” versus “intensive” margin reflect the distinction between whether to invest 
(extensive) and how much to invest (intensive). The former is typically measured by the number of 
households entered the programme and the latter by the average investment amount for those that 
participated. These notions have been largely used in the economics literature (for instance, Blundell et 
al. 2013).  
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Our paper relates to the rich and informative literature that examines the 
willingness-to-pay with respect to house energy retrofits. Studies have shown that 
such retrofits are significantly valued by home owners and tenants (Banfi et al. 2008; 
Grösche and Vance 2009; Kwak et al. 2010) while the household’s demographic 
profile plays a significant role in deciding whether to invest in EERs (Das et al. 
2012). We contribute to this literature by offering casual evidence of whether lower-
income households respond to an effective decrease of the EER costs. 
While we do not examine how energy use changed after the EERs, our paper 
also relates to the large literature of the rebound effect. Simply put, the rebound effect 
occurs when households that invest in EERs end up using more energy than the 
energy savings predicted; in certain cases, households may end up using the same 
amount of energy as before in order to enjoy better housing conditions (Greening et 
al. 2000). A large literature has shown that the rebound effect is more prevalent for 
lower-income households (Ehrhardt-Martinez and Laitner 2010; Chitnis et al. 2014; 
Aydin et al. 2017; Fowlie et al. 2018). This is an intuitive result given that lower-
income households spend disproportionately larger share of their income for energy 
and heating costs (Bird et al. 2012). Coupled with the fact that many of these 
households live below average levels of warmth, EERs will result to energy savings 
but also to moderate increases in energy use to attain improved comfort levels to 
catch-up with middle class living standards and health conditions (Howden-Chapman 
et al., 2012).. Our paper contributes to this literature by explicitly considering lower-
income households’ behavior with respect EER cost reductions. 
Finally, given that our focus is on Greece, it is useful to discuss why it is an 
interesting case study. Of all EU member countries, it has arguably been the one hit 
most by the financial crisis with GDP and income levels decreasing sharply the last 
decade (Gibson et al. 2012). Indeed, Papada and Kaliampakos (2016) in survey of 
Greek households showed that 58% are energy poor. This can potentially have 
negative effects to the population’s health (Kentikelenis et al. 2011) with one such 
channel being the worsening housing conditions. To make matters worse, Greece 
ranks very low in energy efficiency across the EU member countries (Makridou et al. 
2015).
 5
 Evidence-based studies such as ours can provide insights to policy makers in 
                                                          
5
 Rapanos and Plemis (2006) have also shown that Greece’s income elasticity with repect to energy 
demand is highly elastic. A fiding that can partly be attributed to the inefficiency of the enrgy sector. 
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Greece as in the foreseeable future, EU will finance more house energy efficiency 
programs.  
 The next section describes the Greek household energy efficiency program in 
detail and the structural break employed in this paper. The following two sections 
discuss the econometric setup and data. The results section outlines the effect of the 
increase in subsidy both on the extensive and intensive margin. The robustness 
section provides the approach and results at the household level. Finally the paper 
concludes. 
 
2. The Greek Household Energy Efficient Program 
 
On January 13, 2011, the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate 
Change issued a press release launching the “Saving in-house” energy savings 
program (hereafter the Program). The Program was co-financed by the European 
Union and its goal was to provide incentives to home owners to engage in EERs. It 
provided financial support in the form of a subsidy and an interest-free loan for 
residential buildings and apartments; the loan would be issued by one of the four 
systemic Greek banks and the Program would pay for the interest amount.  
Applications could be submitted on or after February 1, 2011 at any point in 
time and the households were notified on the award through publicly released lists; 
these lists were published periodically (every few months). The Program’s first 
recipients were notified on July 14, 2011 and until March 3, 2012 there were 8 such 
lists covering 10,248 awarded households.  
The Call’s first financial scheme for these aforementioned participant was 
structured based on income criteria as follows: For single (family) households with 
incomes below €22,000 (€40,000), the Program would subsidize 35% of the EERs; 
for single (family) households with incomes between €22,000-€40,000 (€40,000-
€60,000), the Program would subsidize 15% of the retrofits. In both cases the rest of 
the approved budget would be provided in the form of an interest-free loan. Finally, 
for single (family) households with incomes between €40,000-€60,000 (€60,000-
€75,000), the Program would not subsidize any of the retrofits but would cover the 
interest of a loan in the case the household wished to apply for such a loan. In all 
cases, the approved retrofit budget could not be larger than €15,000. We denote these 
income types as A.I, B.I and C.I, respectively. Table 1 shows the income types and 
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their associated subsidy rate. As can clearly be seen, the overwhelming majority 
(99.3%) of households belonged in the low income category. This overwhelming 
majority is most likely due to the low or zero amount of subsidy with respect to the 
rest of the income types. Even a 15% subsidy for the B.I. households may not be 
appealing when all the hidden costs with respect to EERs are accounted for.
6
 
 
Table 1 goes about here. 
 
 On March 12, 2012, roughly eight months after the first households were 
notified of the support, the Ministry changed the amount of support and income 
criteria. This change was largely unanticipated as revealed by a cursory review of 
media outlets. The incentive scheme became effective immediately.  
The new scheme was as follows. For single (family) households with incomes 
below €12,000 (€20,000), the subsidy rate would be 70%; for single (family) 
households with incomes €12,000-€40,000 (€20,000-€60,000), the subsidy rate would 
be 35%; for single (family) households with incomes €40,000-€60,000 (€60,000-
€80,000), the subsidy rate would be 15%. We denote these income types as A.II, B.II 
and C.II, respectively. In all cases, the household would receive an interest free loan 
for the rest of the approved budget which as before could not exceed €15,000. Table 1 
displays these ‘new’ income types, their associated subsidy rate and participation rate. 
This change in income criteria and support scheme clearly provided a 
substantial incentive for single (family) households with incomes below €12,000 
(€20,000) – A.II income types. Prior to the change, the amount of subsidy was 35% 
while after the change doubled to 70%. It further provided incentives for middle 
income households since after the change they would receive a 35% subsidy instead 
of the prior 15%. 
 
3. Econometric Specifications at the Zip Code Level: The Effect of House Energy 
Efficiency Costs on the Extensive and Intensive Margin 
                                                          
6
 For instance, Joskow and Marron (1992) found significant transaction costs to utility conservation 
programs while there are other costs such as search costs for the best price and quality for EERs (Jaffe 
et al. 2004). Fowlie et al. (2015) also found significant non-monetary costs associated with 
participation in EER support programs. For a comprehensive review of all types of hidden costs see 
Gillingham et al. (2009).  
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Our first question examines whether the increased incentives for lower-income 
households affected the number of such households entering the Program (extensive 
margin). The second question examines whether lower-income households that 
entered the Program after the change invested more in EERs than households that 
entered before the Program (intensive margin).  
In the ideal setup, we would have the income type for each household. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the exact income information for every household. 
Therefore, for houses before the change we cannot classify them based on the new 
income classifications; had we had such information we would be able to examine a 
counterfactual on these lower-income households by comparing the participation of 
single (family) households below €12,000 (20,000),  in the before and after period.  
To this end, we set up an aggregate analysis at the zip code level.
 7
 The 
Ministry of Finance, in 2012, published for the first and last (to this date) time the 
average household income per zip code.
8
 Given that for 95% of our observations we 
have consistent zip code information we can observe the number of households that 
participated in the Program per zip code and whether the change had an additional 
effect on the number of houses for lower-income zip codes. In its simplest form the 
baseline specification is the following: 
 
                                                           (1) 
 
Where           is the number of houses that entered the program in zip code i at 
period t. t here can take two values corresponding to a before and an after period; i.e. 
before or after March 12, 2012.        takes the value of 1 for the period after the 
change and 0 for the period before.              takes the value of 1 for zip codes 
below a certain income level and 0 otherwise. In certain versions we classify lower-
income zip codes as those below the median income level while in other versions as 
those below the 33
rd
 percentile. Finally          is a set of dummy variables for each 
zip code in the sample.  
The coefficient of importance here is that of the interaction. To validate our 
hypothesis that lower-income regions were more responsive to the added incentives 
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 We should note that region-level analysis has been performed for similar questions in the literature 
(e.g. Bradshawa et al. 2014). 
8
 http://www.gsis.gr/gsis/info/gsis_site/PublicIssue/  
8 
 
we would expect for    to be positive indicating an added effect of the change on the 
behavior of such regions. 
Given that our dependent variable is a count variable, we report results from an 
unconditional fixed effects Negative Binomial estimation. This way we are able to 
account for overdispersion in the data (Allison and Waterman, 2002). Finally, we 
cluster standard errors at the zip code level to account for possible serial correlation 
(Bertrand et al., 2004) 
The second question relates to the intensive margin of house energy efficiency 
investments. We replace the dependent variable of equation (1) with a variety of 
different variables to approximate the intensive margin. First, we examine the natural 
log of the application amount of the average household in each zip code. Second, we 
examine the natural log of the approved budget of the average household. Third, we 
consider the share of households within each zip code that filed for a budget higher 
than the €13,000.9 Fourth, we consider the share of households within each zip code 
that were awarded a budget higher than €13,000. 
We should note two points with respect to application amount and award amount. 
First, 65.3% of the households were approved the budget they asked for. Second, 
7.3% of the households filed for a budget of more than the maximum allowed of 
€15,000. This practice was not necessarily a faulty one; a household needed to show 
the entire retrofit plan even though it knew that only up to €15,000 could be approved. 
 
4. Data 
We draw data from two sources. First, the individual level data of each 
participant are obtained from the Hellenic Fund for Entrepreneurship and 
Development (HFED).
10
 Decisions on awards of the subsidy were published every 
few months between July 2011 and August of 2015. For each awarded residence we 
obtained the following variables: zip code, application amount, grant amount and 
income type. 
The second main source is the General Secretariat of Information Systems 
(GSIS).
11
 In 2012 the GSIS published the average family income per zip code for the 
                                                          
9
 The €13,000 amount roughly corresponds to the 66th percentile of the distribution of application 
amount over all households. 
10
 http://www.etean.com.gr/publicpages/NewsAnnouncements4.aspx  
11
 http://www.gsis.gr/gsis/info/gsis_site/PublicIssue/  
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calendar year of 2011. It was the first year that such data were published and have not 
been updated since.  
Overall, we obtained information on all 50,038 houses that were awarded the 
support. However, right from the outset we excluded 2,147 houses that either lacked 
zip code information or the zip code was inconsistent (mostly typos).  
We aggregated these data at the zip code level and whether the award decision 
was announced before or after March 12, 2012. From the aggregation we excluded the 
households that were notified of the support on August 2, 2012 as these households 
are likely to have filed for the support prior to March 12, 2012 and therefore do not 
belong in the after group; we discuss this issue further in the Robustness section. 
Further, given that the funds allocated to the Program were depleted before the end of 
the Program, we drop all the participants that were notified in 2015 to avoid any 
censoring issues. With the above two exclusions, we reduce the sample to 44,039 
awards. Finally, we drop three outlier zip codes where the average family income is 
more than €50,000 reducing our final baseline sample for the core analysis to 44,021 
households and 992 zip codes where at least one house has participated in the 
program. 
 
Table 2 goes about here 
 
Based on the 992 zip codes, the median family income is €16,860. Table 2 – 
Panel A shows that prior to the change, lower-income zip codes had on average 13.3 
houses participating while after the change 45.5 indicating a 340% increase. On the 
other hand the higher-income zip codes participated with 6.4 houses on average 
before and 23.5 after indicating to a 370% increase. Both of these increases are to be 
expected as after the change, there were considerably more houses that entered the 
Program; i.e. of the 44,021 houses, 9,767 entered before the change and 34,254 after 
the change. Further, from this simple comparison we cannot readily infer whether 
lower-income zip codes were more responsive to change as we have not captured zip 
code heterogeneity which we will take into account in the econometric analysis. 
Table 2 – Panel B displays summary statistics for the intensive margin. First, 
we need to note that we drop 2,747 households due to erroneous amount data.
 12
 
                                                          
12
 For instance the sum of the total grant amount exceeded the application amount. 
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Second, for this part of the analysis, we focus only on the zip codes where there is at 
least one participant before and one after the change. With these exclusions, there are 
830 zip codes remaining.  
The average house in lower-income zip codes requested for a budget of 
€11,469 and was awarded €10,196 while after the change the two figures increased by 
9.5% and 19%, respectively. On the other hand, the application amount and grant 
amount for the higher-income zip codes increased by merely 1% and 11%, 
respectively. We further examine per zip code the share of households that either 
applied or were awarded more than €13,000. As can be seen lower-income regions 
increase the shares by fifteen and twenty two percentage units whereas higher-income 
regions increased by just three and twelve percentage units respectively. These figures 
show that houses from lower-income regions increased their investments 
disproportionately more than higher-income zip codes; in other words the subsidy 
increase had a significant effect on the intensive margin of lower-income households. 
We examine these changes further in the econometric analysis. 
 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 shows the effect of the Program change on the propensity of zip 
codes’ participation for a series of data specifications by estimating equation (1).   
 
Table 3 goes about here 
 
In Column 1 we observe that after the change all zip codes increased their 
participation by an average of exp(1.122) = 3.07 times compared to the before period. 
Further, the zip codes below the median income level participated an additional 
exp(0.102) = 10% more than zip codes above the median income level as the 
interaction term After_x_LowIncomeMedian shows. Column 2 redefines the low 
income dummy by considering only the zip codes located below the 33
rd
 percentile. 
The differential effect is even stronger. In Columns 3 and 4 we further drop the year 
2014 to avoid any remaining censoring issues.
13
 Results are qualitatively similar. 
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 One zip code is dropped as during the new sample period, no household has participated and 
therefore is perfectly identified by its associated zip code fixed effect. 
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The above results show that after the more favorable treatment of lower-
income households, zip codes with lower-income increased their participation to the 
program compared to higher-income zip codes. Therefore, an effective decrease in 
EER costs induced more households in engaging in such activities.  
Table 4 examines the effect of the subsidy rate increase on the intensive 
margin of EERs.  
 
Table 4 goes about here 
 
Column 1 examines the natural logarithm of the application amount from the 
average household. The coefficient of After shows that the average household from a 
higher-income region increases its application amount by almost 2% compared to 
before; however, the coefficient is not significant. The interaction of 
After_x_LowIncomeMedian is however significant and indicates that the average 
household from a lower-income region increased its requested amount by an 
additional 8.8%. When in Column 2 we examine the natural logarithm of the awarded 
amount, the average household from a higher-income region increases its amount by 
almost 12.1% compared to before. The interaction term of 
After_x_LowIncomeMedian is again significant indicating that there is an additional 
effect for the lower-income regions. In Columns 3 and 4 we consider the share of 
households in the zip code that requested and awarded a budget of more than €13,000 
respectively. The interaction term of After_x_LowIncomeMedian again shows that 
there is an additional effect for the lower-income regions. In other words, in lower-
income regions the share of houses with close to allowable budget that participated in 
the Program increased substantially more than in the higher-income regions. 
In Columns 5-8, we consider the After_x_LowIncome33rd interaction term; 
results are qualitatively similar with the previous columns. Further, in the Appendix 
we examine zip codes where at least two or three households participated both in the 
before and after period. Results are qualitatively similar. 
 
6. Robustness. Econometric Specification at the Household Level 
As already stated, we cannot classify households that were awarded the 
support before the change, based on the income levels A.II, B.II, and C.II 
respectively. However, for a subset of households that were awarded the support after 
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the income criteria change, we can confidently argue that most of these households 
filed before the change. To provide basis for this argument, we offer a detailed 
timeline of the Program. 
On February 1, 2011 the Ministry welcomed its first applications for the 
Program. Almost five and a half months later, the first 2,216 recipients were notified 
via a public announcement (Figure 1). We denote this five and a half month lag as 
reference lag that could take for an application during the grant process.  
On March 12, 2012 the Ministry announced the change of the income criteria 
and subsidy amounts. The first notification right after the change was on August 2, 
2011, five months after the announcement. Given the five and a half month reference 
lag in addition to any potential backlog, it is reasonable to assume that the 
overwhelming majority of the applicants awarded the support in August had filed for 
the Program prior to the announcement but reaped, unknowingly at the time of 
application, the benefits of the new subsidy scheme. Therefore, for this analysis we 
can treat the August 2, 2011 recipients as the before group. The second wave of award 
recipients after the change was on December 3, 2012, nine months after the 
announcement; thus, most of such recipients were likely to have filed for the program 
after the announcement. We treat these recipients as the after group and for the 
following analysis, we focus only on these two groups. The benefit of focusing on 
these two groups is that because both were awarded after the change, we can have 
information on the income levels based on the A.II, B.II, C.II classifications. 
We have consistent data for 7,743 households – 2,783 and 4,960 for the before 
and after group respectively. In the group before, lower-income households (A.II) 
account for 37.7% of the total recipients while in the after group for 60.7%. This 
simple participation rate difference is consistent with the aforementioned analysis and 
provides evidence that the lower-income households were responsive to the added 
subsidy incentives provided in the program.  
Formally, we test the effect of the subsidy increase on the extensive margin as 
follows: 
 
                                       (2) 
 
Where                takes the value of 1 if the j
th
 household is in the A.II 
income class and 0 otherwise. Afterj,t takes the value of 1 if the j
th
 household is from 
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the after group (December 2012, 2011 recipients) and 0 if it is from the before group 
(August 2, 2011 recipients). We also include zip code fixed effects (        ). The 
coefficient of interest is   ; a positive and significant coefficient would show that the 
share of lower-income recipients is larger for the December 2012, 2011 group than 
the August 2, 2011 group.  
As an estimator we opt for the linear probability model via the use of 
Ordninary Least Squares. Even though the dependent variable is a dummy, a probit or 
logit model would be more appropriate; however, the large number of fixed effects 
makes such estimators less precise (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).  
The single estimation in Table 5 shows the results from equation (2). When 
the household belongs in the after group (December 2012, 2011 recipients), it is 20.5 
percentage units more likely be a lower-income (A.II) household. This simple result 
shows that the subsidy increase affected positively the extensive margin for lower-
income households; a result consistent with the aforementioned analysis. 
 
Table 5 goes about here 
 
 
To test the intensive margin, we estimate the following equation(s): 
 
                                                                 (3) 
 
   can be four different variables. First, we consider the natural log of the 
requested amount; second, the natural log of the grant amount; fourth a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the household requested for more than €13,000 and 0 otherwise; 
fourth a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the household was granted more than 
€13,000 and 0 otherwise. All these four different versions can show the response of 
lower-income households due to the subsidy change on the intensive margin.  
Our focus is on   . A positive    shows that lower-income households spent 
more in the after period in addition to any increased spending from the higher-income 
households.  
Table 6 displays the results. Column 1 shows that higher-income households 
in the after group requested for 2% less budget as the coefficient of After shows. 
Lower-income households in the before group requested 5% more than higher-income 
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households in the before group as the coefficient to LowerIncome shows. Finally, 
lower-income households after the change requested for 14.4% more budget than 
what the higher-income households requested. In Column 2 this interaction term is 
again positive and significant. In Column 3, the interaction term is interpreted as 
follows: lower-income households in the after group were 10.8% more likely than the 
higher-income households in the after group to request an amount of more than 
13,000. A similar interpretation can be made for Column 4 and the awarded amount.  
 
Table 6 goes about here 
 
There are two significant insights from the above table. First, we observe that 
lower-income households spend more than higher-income households in the before 
group as the positive coefficient of LowerIncome shows. This result could imply that 
lower-income households were in greater need for retrofits prior to the enactment of 
the Program or that their houses were already in a worse shape than the higher-income 
households’ residences.  
Second, the interaction term is always positive and significant implying that 
after the change lower-income households increased their retrofit investments more 
than higher-income households. This result accords and provides robustness to the 
intensive margin results from the zip code analysis. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Several studies across countries have raised concerns about the house energy 
efficiency of lower-income households and the potential welfare and energy benefits 
improved efficiency can have. To this end, studies have examined whether different 
kinds of incentives can persuade such households into investing in house energy 
efficiency retrofits. The challenge for an observer, in many occasions, is to pinpoint 
such incentives’ impact due to the lack of exogenous variation.    
Our setting is the largest energy efficiency support program in Greece that ran 
during 2011-2015. We exploited an exogenous and abrupt change that benefited 
lower-income households by providing a larger subsidy rate than previously. We 
found that both the participation rate (extensive margin) and the investment amount 
(intensive margin) increased for such households compared to their higher-income 
counterparts.  
15 
 
Our policy recommendations are straightforward. Lower-income households 
in Greece respond to monetary incentives to invest in EERs. While an allocated 
budget for future support programs may not be infinite policy makers may need to 
prioritize the types of houses that are less energy efficient and provide additional 
incentives. Such incentives need not be in the form of subsidies as they could be tax 
deductions from retrofit constructions. 
We should further mention that due to data unavailability we have not 
discussed the degree of free-ridership for this energy efficiency program. In short 
free-ridership occurs when households that would invest in EERs even in the absence 
of support programs (Grösche and Vance 2009). Therefore, it is clear that any 
efficiency of a support program is diminished by such behavior. Our policy 
recommendation of tax deductions is influenced by the study of Nauleau (2014) 
where she found for the case of France that tax deductions had a diminishing effect 
over time on free-ridership. 
Finally, empirical evidence remains to be provided, from a social welfare 
perspective, whether the increased subsidy reduced energy use sufficiently after the 
retrofits. Whether there is a rebound effect requires additional data from utility 
companies; however, such analysis could provide significant insights for policy 
makers in Greece. We leave this endeavor for future research. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of the house energy efficiency program. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Feb 1, 2011: 
Agency started accepting 
applications 
July 14, 2011: 
First Award Notification 
(First 2,216 recipients) 
March 12, 2012: 
Announcement of Income 
Criteria and Support 
Scheme Change 
August 2, 2012: 
First notification after the 
change announcement 
December 12, 2012: 
Second notification after 
the change announcement 
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Table 1. Support Schemes by household income type: Before and after subsidy change. 
 Type 
 A.I. B.I. C.I 
Before Change    
Single Income €0-22,000 €22,000-40,000 €40,000-60,000 
Family Income €0-40,000 €40,000-60,000 €60,000-75,000 
Subsidy 35% 15% 0% 
Level of Participation 
(over all households before change) 
99.3% 0.7% 0% 
 A.II. B.II. C.II 
After Change:     
Single Income €0-12,000 €12,000-40,000 €40,000-60,000 
Family Income €0-20,000 €20,000-60,000 €60,000-80,000 
Subsidy 70% 35% 15% 
Level of Participation 
(over all households after change) 
68.8% 30.7% 0.50% 
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Table 2. Summary statistics by before and after subsidy change and zip codes 
 Before Change After Change %Change 
Panel A    
Lower-income zip codes 13.3 45.5 340% 
Higher-income zip codes 6.4 23.5 370% 
Panel B    
Lower-income zip codes    
Average Application Amount €11,469 €12,560 9.5% 
Average Grant Amount €10,196 €12,161 19% 
%of Households that Requested for more than €13,000 0.45 0.61 Fifteen percentage units   
%of Households that were Awarded more than €13,000 0.33 0.58 Twenty two percentage units   
Higher-income zip codes    
Average Application Amount €10,251 €10,315 -1% 
Average Grant Amount €8,821 €9,884 12% 
%of Households that Requested for more than €13,000 0.35 0.38 Three percentage units  
%of Households that were Awarded more than €13,000 0.23 0.35 Twelve percentage units  
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Table 3. Effect of income criteria change on the number of households 
participating in the Program (Extensive Margin). Zip code analysis. 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Households 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
After 1.122*** 1.129*** 0.989*** 0.993*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0282) (0.0327) (0.0288) 
After_x_LowIncomeMedian 0.102**  0.102*  
 (0.0509)  (0.0531)  
After_x_LowIncome33rd  0.145**  0.160** 
  (0.0604)  (0.0636) 
     
Observations 1,984 1,984 1,982 1,982 
Number of Zip Codes 992 992 991 991 
Zip Code FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Negative Binomial estimations. LowIncomeMedian takes the value of 1 if the zip code’s 
income is below the median and 0 otherwise. LowIncome33rd takes the value of 1 if the zip 
code’s income is below the 33rd percentile and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the 
zip code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Effect of income criteria change on the investment amount of households participating in the Program (Extensive Margin). Zip 
code analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES lnAppAmount lnGAmount ShareAppMore13K ShareGMore13K lnAppAmount lnGAmount ShareAppMore13K ShareGMore13K 
         
After 0.0212 0.121*** 0.0299 0.118*** 0.0376** 0.134*** 0.0528*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0156) (0.0191) (0.0171) (0.0147) (0.0134) (0.0171) (0.0158) 
After_x_LowIncomeMedian 0.0884*** 0.0704*** 0.136*** 0.125***     
 (0.0263) (0.0243) (0.0314) (0.0295)     
After_x_LowIncome33rd     0.0852*** 0.0677** 0.139*** 0.132*** 
     (0.0312) (0.0288) (0.0375) (0.0352) 
         
Observations 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 1,660 
R-squared 0.695 0.741 0.669 0.699 0.693 0.740 0.667 0.698 
Number of Zip Codes 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 
Zip Code FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimations. lnAppAmount is the natural logarithm of the amount filed of the average house in the zip code. lnGAmount is the natural logarithm 
of the amount awarded of the average house in the zip code. ShareAppMore13K is the share of households in the zip code that requested for more than €13,000. 
ShareGMore13K is the share of households in the zip code that were awarded more than €13,000.  LowIncomeMedian takes the value of 1 if the zip code’s income is below 
the median and 0 otherwise. LowIncome33rd takes the value of 1 if the zip code’s income is below the 33rd percentile and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the zip 
code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
24 
 
Table 5. Household level analysis. Effect of change on the extensive margin. 
VARIABLES LowerIncome 
  
After 0.205*** 
 (0.0137) 
Constant 0.393*** 
 (0.00879) 
  
Observations 7,743 
R-squared 0.203 
Number of Zip Codes 778 
Zip Code FE YES 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimations. LowerIncome takes the value of 1 if the household is in the 
A.II income class and 0 otherwise. After takes the value of 1 if the household is from the after group 
(December 2012 recipients) and 0 if it from the before group (August 2, 2011 recipients). Standard 
errors are clustered at the zip code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 6. Household level analysis. Effect of change on the intensive margin. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES lnAppAmount lnGAmount AppMore13K GMore13K 
     
After -0.0243 -0.0487** 0.00538 -0.0195 
 (0.0193) (0.0197) (0.0157) (0.0174) 
LowerIncome 0.0541** 0.0566*** 0.0635*** 0.0658*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0215) (0.0173) (0.0188) 
After_x_LowerIncome 0.144*** 0.137*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0226) (0.0240) 
     
Observations 7,657 7,657 7,657 7,657 
R-squared 0.258 0.250 0.226 0.224 
Number of Zip Codes 778 778 778 778 
Zip Code FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimations. lnAppAmount is the natural logarithm of the amount filed 
by the household. lnGAmount is the natural logarithm of the amount awarded by the household. 
AppMore13K is a dummy that take the value of 1 if the household requested for more than €13,000. 
GMore13K is a dummy that take the value of 1 if the household was awarded more than €13,000. 
LowerIncome takes the value of 1 if the household is in the A.II income class and 0 otherwise. After 
takes the value of 1 if the household is from the after group (December 2012 recipients) and 0 if it from 
the before group (August 2, 2011 recipients). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix – Robustness at the zip code level for the intensive margin. 
 
Table A.1. Effect of income criteria change on the investment amount of households participating in the Program (Extensive Margin). 
Zip code analysis. Consider zip codes where at least two houses were awarded the support both before and after the change. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES lnAppAmount lnGAmount ShareAppMore13K ShareGMore13K lnAppAmount lnGAmount ShareAppMore13K ShareGMore13K 
         
After 0.0258 0.129*** 0.0270 0.115*** 0.0395*** 0.139*** 0.0483*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0167) (0.0151) (0.0140) (0.0125) (0.0151) (0.0141) 
After_x_LowIncomeMedian 0.0752*** 0.0524** 0.129*** 0.113***     
 (0.0243) (0.0219) (0.0280) (0.0264)     
After_x_LowIncome33rd     0.0743*** 0.0501** 0.136*** 0.116*** 
     (0.0279) (0.0252) (0.0338) (0.0318) 
         
Observations 1,430 1,430 1,430 1,430 1,430 1,430 1,430 1,430 
R-squared 0.733 0.786 0.710 0.743 0.732 0.785 0.708 0.741 
Number of Zip Codes 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 
Zip Code FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimations. lnAppAmount is the natural logarithm of the amount filed of the average house in the zip code. lnGAmount is the natural logarithm 
of the amount awarded of the average house in the zip code. ShareAppMore13K is the share of households in the zip code that requested for more than €13,000. 
ShareGMore13K is the share of households in the zip code that were awarded more than €13,000.  LowIncomeMedian takes the value of 1 if the zip code’s income is below 
the median and 0 otherwise. LowIncome33rd takes the value of 1 if the zip code’s income is below the 33rd percentile and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the zip 
code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.2. Effect of income criteria change on the investment amount of households participating in the Program (Extensive Margin). 
Zip code analysis. Consider zip codes where at least three houses were awarded the support both before and after the change. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES lnAppAmount lnGAmount ShareAppMore13K ShareGMore13K lnAppAmount lnGAmount ShareAppMore13K ShareGMore13K 
         
After 0.0375** 0.137*** 0.0329** 0.107*** 0.0476*** 0.144*** 0.0506*** 0.125*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0142) (0.0157) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0144) (0.0135) 
After_x_LowIncomeMedian 0.0702*** 0.0487** 0.122*** 0.112***     
 (0.0234) (0.0212) (0.0276) (0.0258)     
After_x_LowIncome33rd     0.0779*** 0.0531** 0.135*** 0.115*** 
     (0.0257) (0.0235) (0.0338) (0.0314) 
         
Observations 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 
R-squared 0.760 0.811 0.725 0.761 0.760 0.810 0.723 0.758 
Number of Zip Codes 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 
Zip Code FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimations. lnAppAmount is the natural logarithm of the amount filed of the average house in the zip code. lnGAmount is the natural logarithm 
of the amount awarded of the average house in the zip code. ShareAppMore13K is the share of households in the zip code that requested for more than €13,000. 
ShareGMore13K is the share of households in the zip code that were awarded more than €13,000.  LowIncomeMedian takes the value of 1 if the zip code’s income is below 
the median and 0 otherwise. LowIncome33rd takes the value of 1 if the zip code’s income is below the 33rd percentile and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the zip 
code level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
